The Image Cannot Speak for Itself:  Film, Summary Judgment, and Visual Literacy by Mezey, Naomi
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 48 
Number 1 Fall 2013 pp.1-39 
Fall 2013 
The Image Cannot Speak for Itself: Film, Summary Judgment, and 
Visual Literacy 
Naomi Mezey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Naomi Mezey, The Image Cannot Speak for Itself: Film, Summary Judgment, and Visual Literacy, 48 Val. 
U. L. Rev. 1 (2013). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
 1
Articles 
THE IMAGE CANNOT SPEAK FOR ITSELF:  
FILM, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND VISUAL 
LITERACY 
Naomi Mezey* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, the Supreme Court held that a Georgia police officer did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the plaintiff, who was fleeing 
police, when the officer intentionally caused the plaintiff’s car to crash 
and rendered the plaintiff quadriplegic.1  The most striking aspect of 
Scott v. Harris is that the existence of video evidence changed the Court’s 
approach not only to the facts but to the legal analysis.  The question 
before the Court was whether summary judgment was proper.  The 
lower courts had found conflicting material facts, but the Supreme Court 
concluded that summary judgment could be granted on the basis of the 
video evidence alone.2  The decision relied on the video taken of the 
chase from the squad car’s “dash-mounted video camera.”3  The Court 
announced that it was pleased “to allow the videotape to speak for 
itself.”4  For the first time, the Court cited to a video link in an opinion 
and posted the video on the Supreme Court webpage to assure its public 
availability.5 
Video images saturate our public and private lives.  Moving images 
are the norm of entertainment and advertising—on city streets, subways, 
and personal screens—as they are increasingly the norm within intimate 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  A much earlier version of this 
Article was originally presented as the Seegers Lecture on Jurisprudence at Valparaiso 
University Law School in November 2011.  I am indebted to the intelligent and diligent 
research assistance of Gabe Lezra and Matthew Murrell, the insightful comments of Lisa 
Heinzerling, Marty Lederman, Nina Pillard, Mike Seidman, Gerry Spann, and Larry Solum, 
as well as fruitful conversation on the topic with colleagues at Valparaiso, University of 
Virginia, and Georgetown law schools. 
1 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 375, 381 (2007) (concluding that no reasonable juror could 
find that the fleeing driver did not pose a deadly risk to the public). 
2 Id. at 378–81. 
3 Id. at 380–81; see id. at 391 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the “dash-
mounted video camera” was activated automatically when the police officer turned on his 
lights). 
4 Id. at 378 n.5 (majority opinion). 
5 Id.; see VIDEO RESOURCES, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/media/media.aspx. 
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spaces and private communication as well.  Images “surround us in the 
same way as a language surrounds us.”6  Images are a language, a form 
of visual communication, and they deserve and require the same 
attention we give to language.  As the realities of our own lives are 
increasingly dominated by images, it is not surprising that they have 
become ubiquitous within the law, presented in litigation and other law-
related contexts as photographs, film, illustrations, diagrams, 
reenactments, visual aids, displays of physical evidence, computer 
animation, x-rays, and fingerprints.  Video images specifically are also 
increasingly common within what was once the primarily textual and 
oral domain of the law.  The most pervasive examples are the videos 
produced by security cameras as well as the cameras placed on the 
inside and outside of police officers’ cars and clipped on officers’ bodies;7 
along with the images from personal cell phones, these cameras capture 
many conflicts, large and small, that make their way to the courtroom.8  
In the legal encounter with the image, there is a recurring assumption 
that images assist us in seeing more clearly and, in seeing more clearly, 
we get closer to “the truth.”9  But images produced by cameras and 
computers are always mediated, their meaning influenced by aspects of 
the medium, the context of viewing, and the perceptions of the viewer.  
That mediation is still frequently overlooked and was overlooked in Scott 
v. Harris.  In this Article, I call for greater sensitivity to the distance 
between seeing and knowing and to how we make images speak, not to 
mention what we have them say. 
                                                 
6 JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 32 (1972).  Even Freud’s classic “mirror stage” has 
become animated.  See PHILIPPE JULIEN, JACQUES LACAN’S RETURN TO FREUD 48–52 (Devra 
Beck Simiu trans., 1994) (discussing the “mirror stage” as initially presented by Lacan and 
influenced by Freud).  The child with the mirror has become the child taking videos of 
herself on a computer. 
7 Erica Goode, Video, a New Tool for the Police, Poses New Legal Issues, Too, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 12, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/police-using-
body-mounted-video-cameras.html?_r=1&emc=eta1 (discussing the use of body- and dash-
mounted video cameras to document arrests, traffic stops, and shootings). 
8 Id. (recognizing that judges are now faced with issues raised by new technologies, 
such as police conduct videos recorded by citizens and later promptly uploaded to 
YouTube). 
9 I am neither committed to the proposition that there is “a truth” of the matter in any 
given legal dispute nor to the conviction that there is not such a truth.  For purposes of this 
Article, I am agnostic on this point and concerned more with the ways in which video 
evidence can guide judicial judgment about what facts need to be known.  This 
determination usually both assumes an underlying truth and that the video can offer 
clarity on it. 
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Despite a common-sense awareness that images do not always “tell 
the truth,” courts still routinely find video evidence to be conclusive.10  
Even when they see conflicting images or hear conflicting interpretations 
of images, courts offer very little analysis of video evidence, instead 
assuming that unaltered images—either as a whole or broken down into 
their constituent frames—provide direct and accurate access to the 
reality they seem to convey.11  This is the problem that motivates this 
Article:  courts and legal actors lack a critical vocabulary of the visual, 
and without visual literacy, they are more likely to be unduly credulous 
in the face of images. 
The lack of visual literacy is especially and problematically evident 
at summary judgment, when judges can end cases if they find that there 
is no genuine factual dispute.12  Without a vocabulary for interpreting 
and interrogating visual images, video evidence is more likely to be seen 
as conclusive and used to grant summary judgment where it otherwise 
would not be.  Indeed, this assumption that videos have a reliable factual 
conclusiveness has not only been modeled by the Supreme Court but has 
been used to alter the standard summary judgment analysis. 
In Scott v. Harris, eight Justices used a police video to justify 
departing from the traditional summary judgment standard, which 
requires that courts refrain from weighing evidence and view the facts in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.13  The Court believed 
that the video allowed it to see accurately what occurred during the 
chase and noted that there was no indication that “what it depict[ed] 
differ[ed] from what actually happened.”14  The Court did not apply the 
well-established lens that requires courts to view the evidence “in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” here, the victim of the 
police’s use of force; instead, the Supreme Court announced what we 
must read as a new summary judgment standard and admonished the 
court of appeals for not viewing the facts “in the light depicted by the 
videotape.”15   
However, the Court fails to acknowledge that “the light depicted by 
the videotape” is left to the perception of the viewing judge.  Without the 
assumption that videotapes, like eyewitnesses, have only one 
perspective, and without a critical vocabulary of the sort used to analyze 
human fallibility or textual ambiguity, this new standard invites judges 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 1–5 (discussing the use of video evidence in 
Scott v. Harris). 
11 See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). 
12 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
13 Scott, 550 U.S. at 373, 380–81. 
14 Id. at 378. 
15 Id. at 380–81. 
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to displace the jury even when the facts depicted by the video are 
disputed by the parties.  Not surprisingly, the Court’s approach to video 
evidence at summary judgment appears to have been very influential, 
especially in the context of police misconduct and excessive force 
claims.16  Moreover, the Court heard Plumhoff v. Rickard in March 2014.17  
This excessive force case, factually quite similar to Scott v. Harris and 
likewise based on video evidence, seems to ensure that the Supreme 
Court will continue to model its impoverished approach to the legal 
interpretation of images. 
Others have noted the need for a visual jurisprudence and have 
started on that endeavor.18  My approach adds to the larger project of 
resisting the legal authority of the image and providing some 
interpretive tools with which to dismantle the undue credulity of courts 
in the face of visual evidence.  It takes its inspiration as much from film 
as from law because film studies and visual culture have a long tradition 
of making sense of images and providing a vocabulary of visual 
literacy.19  One of the best examples of a film that conveys why it is 
important for the law to have a critical visual vocabulary is the 2002 
movie Minority Report,20 with its sophisticated reflection on the legal uses 
and abuses of visual evidence.   
                                                 
16 See Martin A. Schwartz et al., Analysis of Videotape Evidence in Police Misconduct Cases, 
25 TOURO L. REV. 857, 863 (2009) (“The lower federal courts have latched on to Scott.  There 
are more and more rulings on summary judgment in favor of police officers based on 
videotape evidence.”); Nina Frank, Note, Such Visible Fiction:  The Expansion of Scott v. 
Harris to Prisoner Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claims, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1481, 1485–
86, 1497–1502 (2011) (discussing several cases with varying fact patterns where district 
courts have relied on the standard in Scott to grant or deny summary judgment for 
defendant correctional officers).  But see, e.g., Moore v. Casselberry, 584 F. Supp. 2d 580, 
585–87 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (refusing to grant summary judgment in an excessive force case, 
reasoning that “although the credibility of plaintiff’s testimony concerning the alleged 
assault [was] certainly inconsistent with [video] evidence and [was] subject to serious 
question, it [was] not so blatantly false that the Court may simply reject it as a matter of 
law”). 
17  Plumhoff v. Rickard, No. 12-1117 (U.S. argued Mar. 4, 2014) (presenting the question 
whether it was error to deny qualified immunity in a case nearly identical to Scott v. 
Harris). 
18 See generally NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY:  THE DIGITAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT (2009); Richard K. Sherwin, Visual 
Jurisprudence, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 11 (2012–2013). 
19 See, e.g., FILM THEORY AND CRITICISM 1–7 (Leo Braudy & Marshall Cohen eds., 5th ed. 
1999) (discussing the ways in which film is a language); RICHARD HOWELLS & JOAQUIM 
NEGREIROS, VISUAL CULTURE 1 (2d ed. 2012) (noting the importance of learning to read 
visual texts using the same rigor with which we read printed texts). 
20 MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 2002); Synopsis for 
Minority Report, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0181689/synopsis (last updated 
Aug. 2013).  Plot descriptions are those of the author. 
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Set in Washington D.C. in 2054, Minority Report focuses on a 
“precrime” police unit that arrests people just before they commit 
murder.  The police know who the perpetrators are because of the 
visions of the three precognitives (“precogs”)—the three sibling seers 
who lie in a state of suspended animation in a pool of photon milk with 
headgear that projects their prescient visions onto a big screen to be 
viewed by the police. Police sort through the images on a screen by 
“scrubbing” them, literally pushing aside and culling out the relevant 
details from an overabundance of visual evidence, to determine the 
location of the approaching crime so they can apprehend the perpetrator 
before it happens. Within the police world of the movie, the images 
appear to “speak for themselves” even when they have the inchoate 
character of dreams.  Despite the fact that the precrime unit recognizes 
that some visual details are not relevant, the officers operate under the 
assumption that the images are fully reliable and always “tell the truth.” 
The plot is driven by the fact that John Anderton, the chief of the 
precrime unit, finds his own name inscribed as the perpetrator of an 
imminent murder and sets out to prove his innocence before the crime 
happens.  He finds the woman who discovered the precogs’ abilities, and 
she tells him the secret that saves him and kills the program:  while the 
precogs are never wrong about what they see, sometimes they disagree 
when one of them sees things differently from the other two.  These 
dissenting interpretations are the visual “minority reports,” which are 
instantly destroyed because for precrime to function “there can’t be any 
suggestion of fallibility.  After all, what good is a Justice system that 
instills doubt?”21 
As this interpretive fallibility comes to light—its revelation projected 
onto a screen within the movie—the program collapses, as does a 
commitment to the truth of the image.  Thus, the secret of the film is also 
the secret of law’s faith in the infallibility of the image, and the film’s 
solution provides a vital lesson for the law:  even the most reliable 
images have at least one minority report—another way of seeing—that 
ought to be considered before video evidence seduces courts into an 
undue credulity that images depict “what actually happened” and can 
provide legal actors with the truth of contested events.  Like the fictional 
precrime unit, the Supreme Court is committed to a fantasy of the truth 
of the image that encourages judges’ ways of seeing to displace juries’ 
ways of seeing. 
                                                 
21 MINORITY REPORT, supra note 20.  The Minority Report script is available at 
http://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/MINORITY_REPORT_--_May_16th_2001_revised_ 
draft_by_Scott_Frank.html. 
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In law, it is utterly ordinary for us to see and argue about the 
ambiguity of language and text; whereas, it is extraordinary for us to 
see—let alone argue about—the ambiguity of the image.  However, in 
the last decade or so, there has been a tremendous growth in scholarship 
at the intersection of law and the visual.22  While this scholarship is 
varied, all of it attests to the fact that the visual has occasioned a 
paradigm shift in the way legal meaning is constructed.  The law itself, 
however, has yet to acknowledge or account for this shift in any serious 
way.  Even while the law reflects scant attention to the insights of other 
fields, popular culture has a much longer tradition of taking law 
seriously and not so seriously; legal shows and movies have been a 
mainstay of the film and television industries for over half a century.23  
Whether the visual appears within the spaces of the law or the law 
within the visual media, their mutual engagement is a source of 
important inquiry for legal scholars and lawyers.  The aim here is to 
advocate for the importance of, and sketch one approach to, a visual 
literacy that could provide us with ways to critically assess the use of 
images within the law generally and at summary judgment in particular. 
This Article urges a visual vocabulary that is attentive to the 
cinematic and cultural mediations of video evidence; accounts for the 
medium, the act of viewing, and the viewer; and reads images as if they 
were a minority report or another interpretive perspective.  The term 
“minority” in this context is meant to convey a double meaning, not only 
a dissenting view but also a different way of seeing informed by 
different lived experiences, including the history and contexts of 
minority perspectives.24  A critical visual literacy can help us visualize 
how we might give legal images multiple voices and narrate their 
multiple ways of seeing. 
I approach this topic by borrowing ideas from art, film, and cultural 
theory to help lay a foundation for visual literacy within the law.  This 
Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II provides a brief discussion of 
visuality and the ways the image has been thought to apprehend reality 
and hence “tell the truth.”  Part III reviews how the image has been 
taken up by the law and its uneasy role as evidence.  Last, Part IV 
                                                 
22 The scholars whose work has influenced me most strongly are Amy Adler, Neal 
Feigenson, Rebecca Johnson, Orit Kamir, Jennifer Mnookin, Austin Sarat, Richard Sherwin, 
Jessica Silbey, Martha Umphrey, and Alison Young, to name only a few. 
23 See Naomi Mezey & Mark C. Niles, Screening the Law:  Ideology and Law in American 
Popular Culture, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 91, 114–66 (2005) (describing the history of television 
shows and movies about law). 
24 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?  Scott v. Harris and 
the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 897–98, 903 (2009) (explaining how 
the Court ignores others’ beliefs). 
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provides a comparison of three paradigmatic approaches to the use of 
documentary images at summary judgment and reassesses them from 
the vantage point of visual literacy:  Scott v. Harris and the more recent 
cases of Gilfand v. Planey and McDowell v. Sherrer.  These three cases are 
similar in that they are all excessive force cases that turn primarily on 
video evidence; together they provide the framework for contrasting 
different approaches to visual representation in the law and considering 
what a critical visual literacy would add to the law’s use of filmic 
evidence. 
The Article’s first claim is simple, yet too often ignored by legal 
actors and flatly contradicted by the Supreme Court:  the image cannot 
speak for itself.  An undue credulity in the image will lead to more 
injustice as judges assume that the camera provides them with an 
unmediated perception of events, a perception that is necessarily the 
product of their own experience.  I do not go so far as to claim video 
images never provide reliable information that speaks to a material issue 
from which a court could grant summary judgment, but only that much 
of the time the depictions of the video are themselves open to 
interpretive dispute and ought to be critically examined like text or 
testimony.  The Article’s second claim is that images produce an excess 
of information, an “orgy of evidence,”25 and that by seeming to say so 
much, images appear to say more than they do.  In the face of images, 
courts are more likely to think they can answer a relevant legal question 
in a case or to frame the legal question through the available evidence.  If 
the legal profession remains visually illiterate and fails to appreciate the 
many ways images speak, as well as the limitations of what those images 
can say, it risks sacrificing the crucial role of the law in interpretation, 
judgment, and justice. 
II.  WAYS OF SEEING AND APPREHENSIONS OF THE REAL 
Art critic and novelist John Berger began his influential book Ways of 
Seeing with the following observation:  “Seeing comes before words.  The 
child looks and recognizes before it can speak.”26  Seeing does have a 
place of privilege within the law, as exemplified by the eyewitness—the 
quintessential bearer of evidentiary information.  Yet with the 
eyewitness, we know to question the relationship between what is seen 
and what is known.  We accept that perceptions differ and that people 
have ways of seeing, recalling, and narrating that influence what is seen 
and known.   
                                                 
25 MINORITY REPORT, supra note 20. 
26 BERGER, supra note 6, at 7. 
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When the camera is the eyewitness, however, we often lose these 
critical instincts.  In the face of mechanical reproduction of the world, we 
tend to forget two important things:  first, even unmanned surveillance 
cameras have ways of seeing, framing, and distorting the events they 
capture and that they have modes of perception; and second, when 
viewers watch the images cameras produce, visual interpretation is 
multiplied.  As Berger says, “although every image embodies a way of 
seeing, our perception or appreciation of an image depends also upon 
our own way of seeing.”27  In other words, the sight captured in the 
image produces at least one way of seeing—though often more—and 
excludes others, and our viewing of the image produces at least another 
way of seeing—though often more—and excludes others. 
Enlightenment, modernity, and postmodernity have all contributed 
to structuring, deconstructing, and multiplying our ways of seeing, not 
to mention our understandings of truth, reality, and representation.  
According to Berger, the conventions of the European oil painting 
defined our understanding of the visual image for 400 years.28  Its way of 
seeing was based on the technique of perspective, in which the viewer is 
placed at the all-seeing center, and the “visible world is arranged for the 
spectator as the universe was once thought to be arranged for God.”29  In 
the twentieth century, however, the camera and modernity fractured our 
fundamental sense of the visual into a multiplicity that depended on 
positionality.30  It made it possible to imagine countless different images 
of the same scene. 
Every drawing or painting that used perspective 
proposed to the spectator that he was the unique centre 
of the world.  The camera—and more particularly the 
movie camera—demonstrated that there was no centre. 
 The invention of the camera changed the way men 
saw.  The visible came to mean something different to 
them.31 
Berger’s is certainly not the only theory of perception and visual 
culture, and it is not my aim to canvas the various approaches to visual 
theory in this Article.  I use both Berger’s terminology and his argument 
because it helps clarify my larger point—that images cannot speak for 
themselves because both the images and their viewers have multiple 
                                                 
27 Id. at 10. 
28 Id. at 84. 
29 Id. at 16. 
30 Id. at 18. 
31 Id. 
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ways of seeing.  On the one hand, the history of Western art is the 
history of how Westerners have been taught to be viewers.  
Enlightenment art both mimicked and made a particular reality.  We 
have learned to perceive the world as if we were at the center of what 
there was to see.  On the other hand, the camera’s ubiquitous presence 
continues to encourage us to believe that we can see everything.  Most 
viewers of evidentiary images bring with them cultural assumptions that 
inform what is visible and how it is visible. 
Modern and postmodern artists and visual theorists have continued 
to try to teach us new ways of seeing, though these lessons have not been 
fully learned in part because they involve unlearning deeply engrained 
Enlightenment understandings.  Modernism took the ruptures 
occasioned by both the camera and capitalism, among other things, and 
used them to question the nature of the image, perception, and 
representation.  Impressionism, cubism, and surrealism were all engaged 
with making evident and reflecting on new ways of seeing and knowing, 
as well as new relationships between the image, the viewer, and the 
object of the image. 
René Magritte’s famous realistic painting of the pipe is now the 
classic case in point.32  He wrote on the canvas beneath the picture, “Ceci 
n’est pas une pipe,” or “This is not a pipe,” to force the viewer to 
consider the difference between an image and its referent and to see the 
painting not as a pipe but more precisely as a painting of a pipe.33  As 
Magritte said of this painting, appropriately entitled The Treachery of 
Images:  “How people reproached me for it!  And yet, could you stuff my 
pipe?  No, it’s just a representation, is it not?  So if I had written on my 
picture ‘This is a pipe,’ I’d have been lying!”34  Magritte’s own statement 
pushes the point—would it have been lying to have written below the 
picture, “This is a pipe”?  What is the truth of this image?  And how does 
Magritte’s narration of the image change its possible meanings? 
 
                                                 
32 RENÉ MAGRITTE, THE TREACHERY OF IMAGES (1929), reproduced at http://www.rene-
magritte.org/the-treachery-of-images.jsp (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). 
33 Id.; see Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words:  The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 683, 689 (2012) (discussing the meanings of The Treachery of Images). 
34 HARRY TORCZYNER, MAGRITTE:  IDEAS AND IMAGES 118 (John P. O’Neill & Ellen 
Schwartz eds., Richard Miller trans., 1977).  Not surprisingly, Michel Foucault wrote an 
essay also entitled This is Not a Pipe about the contradictions between the text and image in 
Magritte’s painting.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, THIS IS NOT A PIPE (James Harkness ed. & trans., 
2d ed. 2008). 
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The Treachery of Images, by René Magritte, 1929 
 
If modernity was concerned with representation and ways of seeing, 
postmodernity might be said to be concerned with epistemology and 
ways of knowing.  If Magritte’s painting has a postmodern successor, it 
is the work This is a Pipe, by anonymous English street artist Banksy,35 
known for his stenciled graffiti, paintings, social satire, and the film Exit 
Through the Giftshop.36  This is a Pipe is a “painting” in which the frame 
partly encloses a painted wall with a pipe and spigot coming out of it.  
Beneath the pipe is written “This is a pipe,” in the same style Magritte 
used in his painting.  The reference is clear, but the humor is reversed 
and multiplied.  While Magritte insisted that representation was 
something different from its referent, such that a painting of a pipe is a 
painting rather than a pipe, Banksy suggests that we see both the pipe 
and the painting as real and the commercial production of art as the 
medium through which each is given meaning.  The frame makes the 
“real” pipe a painting, but the frame is placed inside the edges of the 
wall so that we see its artifice and must acknowledge its power to change 
our perception.  In addition to asking us to reflect on representation, 
Banksy asks us to reflect on presentation, framing, the meaning of art, 
and epistemology.  Banksy’s pipe can also be seen as a metaphor for how 
the camera frames images and how the context in which we view them—
                                                 
35 BANKSY, THIS IS A PIPE, reproduced at http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-
UyQfKdhx7K8/T04SYnjOeuI/AAAAAAAAEPE/nMv1C_beCJk/s1600/Banksy-this-is-a-
pipe.jpg (last visited Oct. 16, 2013). 
36 EXIT THROUGH THE GIFT SHOP (Paranoid Pictures 2010). 
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courtroom, movie theater, office, etc.—changes how we make sense of 
what we see. 
This is a Pipe, by Banksy 
 
It may well be that like Banksy’s pipe, film and computer-aided 
video images are as much the paradigm of postmodern representation as 
Magritte’s The Treachery of Images was for modernist representation.  Film 
technologies have ushered in new disruptions of the real and of 
representation and show more vividly in their motion, animation, and 
juxtaposition, the discursive power of moving images.  Film not only 
represents but narrates, and in so doing, brings into being new forms of 
seeing and meaning-making that should be distinguished from 
enlightenment painting, modern art, and even the photograph.37   
We have all become viewers who are used to seeing edited films and 
accept film editing as a kind of narration.  Film editors choose and 
sequence images and scenes, cut out the images that are not necessary to 
the story, and do it in a way that is usually unnoticeable to the viewer.  
In his brilliant book on film editing, Walter Murch explores the mystery 
of the “cut,” the most basic tool of film editing, and why it works “even 
                                                 
37 Richard Sherwin argues that different screen technologies should also be 
distinguished from each other.  Richard K. Sherwin, What Screen Do You Have in Mind?  
Contesting the Visual Context of Law and Film Studies, in 46 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND 
SOCIETY 3, 5 (Austin Sarat ed., 2009). 
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though it represents a total and instantaneous displacement of one field 
of vision with another, a displacement that sometimes also entails a jump 
forward or backward in time as well as space.”38  One explanation for 
why the cut’s disruption of reality works in film is because at its most 
violent it mimics how we jump between and juxtapose images in 
dreams.  At its most subtle it operates like the blink of an eye—an 
interruption of visual continuity that we do not even notice.39  The result 
is that film editing works, and it works on us, making us into viewers 
who both see and do not see the way images narrate, even when the 
framing and cutting are not the products of deliberate choices. 
Notably, these various disruptions of the real—as I have called 
them—are not a clichéd postmodern claim that there is no reality and no 
truth.  Both modernity and postmodernity have insisted, at the very 
least, on multiple realities and multiple truths, which ought to prompt us 
to look for minority reports.  As John Fiske explains: 
The . . . realities of postmodernity are both pluralized 
and extend along two axes—one of the discourse into 
which reality is put and by which it is known to be real, 
and the other of the social conditions of those who 
experience that reality as their own, and who experience 
it as real, although it may differ from the reality 
experienced by those positioned differently.40 
Fiske, like Berger, wants to make evident that images do not come with 
ready-made meaning but are understood through the “discourses” into 
which they are put, or what I have been calling their multiple 
mediations. 
We can and should be more attentive to the ways in which images 
are made meaningful by reflecting on the different techniques of visual 
interpretation evident in the medium, viewing context, and individual 
viewer.  For example, film as a medium is understood through its two 
key “grammatical components:  the shot and the edit.  The shot is 
completed inside the camera and is the most fundamental grammatical 
unit of the cinema.  The edit is the order and way the shots are put 
together.”41 
                                                 
38 WALTER MURCH, IN THE BLINK OF AN EYE:  A PERSPECTIVE ON FILM EDITING 5 (2d ed. 
2001). 
39 Id. at 58–60. 
40 John Fiske, Admissible Postmodernity:  Some Remarks on Rodney King, O.J. Simpson, and 
Contemporary Culture, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 917, 917–18 (1996). 
41 HOWELLS & NEGREIROS, supra note 19, at 212. 
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Thus, we cannot fully assess the significance of video evidence 
without thinking about the medium’s own way of seeing.  We might 
consider the shot by asking about the position of the camera, the angle, 
and the way the images are framed.  Likewise, the selection of the 
images by either machine or human is a kind of edit undertaken in law 
usually by the parties, the lawyers, or the judge.  In addition to the film 
medium, meaning is influenced by the environment in which the image 
is experienced:  the museum, the Hollywood premiere, the classroom, or 
the courtroom.42  Finally, images are experienced and understood with 
reference to the lived “social conditions” that inform the perceptions of 
the viewer, the audience, or the jurors.  Each of these techniques of visual 
interpretation that emphasize the medium, the viewing context, and the 
audience, creates an opportunity for alternative perspectives, and each 
contributes to the possible narratives through which we make sense of 
the images.  Both law and film are powerful discourses that frame and 
narrate images in particular ways and, hence, partly shape our 
understandings and expectations of what we can see in a given context.  
Likewise, the camera and computer have helped to create their own 
ways of seeing and, in a sense, their own viewers, as we, their spectators, 
have arranged our understandings of the visual accordingly. 
Within the discourse of law, however, without a critical visual 
vocabulary, we often insist on not seeing what art and technologies have 
taught us.  We forget that cameras frame the images they capture and 
render unseen those things outside the frame; that they always situate 
the viewer relative to the image; that film and video narrate as well as 
depict; and that images have different meanings in different contexts to 
people with different ways of seeing.  We see images differently when 
we see them in a classroom, in a bedroom, or on a city street.  For 
example, the images I discuss in this Article will have a different 
meaning than they would if they were not illustrating my words in a law 
review article and if they were not being used in the service of my own 
argument.43  In other words, the images speak powerfully, but they 
cannot, despite Justice Scalia’s insistence to the contrary, speak for 
themselves. 
                                                 
42 LOUIS-GEORGES SCHWARTZ, MECHANICAL WITNESS:  A HISTORY OF MOTION PICTURE 
EVIDENCE IN U.S. COURTS 10 (2009) (“The moving image . . . always appears within a 
particular institution and is conditioned by that institution’s pragmatic requirements and 
history.”). 
43 Berger makes this argument with respect to his own essay.  “In this essay each image 
reproduced has become part of an argument which has little or nothing to do with the 
painting’s original independent meaning.  The words have quoted the paintings to confirm 
their own verbal authority.”  BERGER, supra note 6, at 28. 
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III.  THE PROMISE AND THREAT OF THE LEGAL IMAGE 
Art history, cultural theory, and film itself have long understood that 
in the face of images the viewer feels like a witness to a scene which has 
simply been revealed rather than deliberately choreographed; the law, 
however, lacks such a history of critical engagement with the visual.  
Instead, law has simply fluctuated between two convictions:  visual 
evidence is either self-evidently probative or deeply prejudicial.  What 
law lacks is the courage of its own critical history.  Legal theories—
particularly Legal Realism, critical legal studies, and critical race 
studies—have provided a tradition of questioning the coherence of 
standard legal categories and of exposing the interpretations, 
assumptions, and positionality on which analogic reasoning and legal 
judgment depend.  Law and humanities scholarship now provides a rich 
vocabulary and a set of methodologies for reading images within law.  A 
visual literacy within law must draw on these critical traditions that 
already exist within legal scholarship and deploy the complimentary 
insights of other fields.  The question remains whether legal practice can 
take the developing visual jurisprudence to heart. 
The following section borrows generally from law and humanities 
scholarship and specifically from the work of Jennifer Mnookin and 
Jessica Silbey to briefly recount the history and practice of visual 
evidence.  Thereafter, this Article considers the most famous example of 
visual evidence—the Rodney King video—from the perspective of 
critical race theory, to begin to explore one possibility of what minority 
reporting might mean when applied to legal images. 
A. Legal Evidence 
Within the domain of law, the image has operated as both a promise 
and a threat.  Its promise is as proof, in which the photograph or film 
provides direct access to the thing or event it depicts.  From its inception, 
the photograph’s allure was that it promised to be more witness than 
hearsay, and as a witness, more reliable than an eyewitness who was 
human and hence fallible.44  It seemed to represent the truth through the 
mechanical ingenuity of the camera, untouched by human subjectivity 
and intervention.  Indeed, the photograph could be thought of as 
replicating rather than representing what it captures.  As Roland Barthes 
said of the photograph, its “essence is to ratify what it represents.”45  
                                                 
44 Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth:  Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 
10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 18–19 (1998). 
45 ROLAND BARTHES, CAMERA LUCIDA:  REFLECTIONS ON PHOTOGRAPHY 85 (Richard 
Howard trans., 1981). 
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Indeed, the seduction of the photograph is that it appears not to 
“represent” at all, but instead narrows the distance between image and 
object.46  It appears to allow us to see the object with our own eyes. 
The power of photographic and video evidence, much like that of 
rhetoric, is also what makes it a threat to law.  As Jennifer Mnookin 
noted in her astute history of photographic evidence, “mechanically 
generated images were simultaneously viewed as offering privileged 
access to truth and as potentially misleading and manipulable.”47  
Mnookin argues that photographic images are threatening in at least 
three ways.  First, if they are treated as proof objects that portray an 
incontestable truth, they could potentially displace the trial altogether.48  
Second, to the extent images are manipulable, they could evade the truth 
through appeal to sensation and prejudice; their very vividness 
threatening to produce an emotional rather than a rational response.49  
Lastly, photographs are also seen as products of human action and 
judgment, subject to distortion and manipulation.50  As judges attempted 
to domesticate both the power and threat of photographic images by 
developing the category of “demonstrative evidence,” a change in what 
counted as effective proof was also taking place.51  The photographic 
image had effectuated a shift in legal ways of seeing so that “proving 
something now often required letting a jury see for itself, appealing to 
jurors not only through argument, but directly through the senses. . . . At 
least to a certain extent, seeing had become believing.”52 
Contained in the legal category of demonstrative evidence was the 
paradox of the photographic image as both “mere illustration”—like any 
other diagram, map, or visual aid that complements verbal testimony—
and as compelling access to an underlying “truth.”53  Thus, it is not 
surprising that visual images also came to be admitted, not merely as 
guides to organizing or understanding testimony or documentary 
evidence, but as substantive evidence available as proof supporting 
disputed facts.  Now that images have moved from the periphery to 
                                                 
46 See JACQUES DERRIDA, THE POST CARD:  FROM SOCRATES TO FREUD AND BEYOND 35 
(1987). 
47 Mnookin, supra note 44, at 7. 
48 Id. at 20. 
49 Id. at 20–21, 65–66. 
50 Id. at 20–21. 
51 Id. at 5–6. 
52 Id. at 66. 
53 Id. at 69–70. 
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become a central form of legal evidence, lawyers, judges and the media 
must become more adept at assessing their legibility.54 
As legal evidence, images are not always a good fit with the process 
by which law turns contested facts into knowledge and judgment.55  
Jessica Silbey has argued that because filmic evidence gives the powerful 
illusion of reality and suggests that viewers can simply draw their own 
conclusions, as if they were witnesses, film evidence ought to be cross-
examined with the same critical scrutiny as are other witnesses.56  
Especially true when images seem most self-evident and legible, courts 
may be inclined to think those images tell us more than they do about 
the legal questions before them.  As a result, courts may make errors 
about where to fit visual evidence into their assessment of the case.  One 
of Silbey’s significant scholarly contributions has been to introduce more 
of the grammar and history of film—from montage, angle, and editing 
on the one hand, to the critical history of cinema studies on the other—to 
encourage lawyers and judges to interrogate filmic evidence.57  Yet when 
images become objects of forensic scrutiny and evidential examination, 
their examination still tends to be minimal—urging the viewer to trust, 
or not trust, what she sees.  The problem, as I see it, goes far beyond the 
courtroom; it is pervasive in law offices, classrooms, and the media.  
Visual literacy must begin earlier and be reinforced in law school if we 
want lawyers and judges to be capable critics of the image. 
In the face of images, a visual literacy must ask the important 
questions suggested by all the scholars I have mentioned:  In what ways 
do images themselves see, speak, and narrate (film theory)?  What do 
images portray?  What do the portrayals mean?  In what way are they 
relevant to the legal questions before the court (legal and linguistic 
                                                 
54 Jennifer L. Mnookin, Semi-Legibility and Visual Evidence:  An Initial Exploration, 2012 L. 
CULTURE & HUMAN. 1, 6 (“This notion of semi-legibility usefully focuses our attention on 
the ways that much visual evidence neither speaks for itself nor permits unbounded 
interpretations, but rather, has a range of plausible—and potentially inconsistent—
readings.”). 
55 Jessica Silbey, Images in/of Law, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 171, 172 (2012–2013). 
56 Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 17, 
19 (2008). 
57 See, e.g., Jessica Silbey, Evidence Verité and the Law of Film, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1257, 
1280–81 (2010) [hereinafter Silbey, Evidence Verité] (“The law requires this kind of critical 
evaluation when assessing evidence.  But what does it mean to critically evaluate a 
photograph?”); Silbey, supra note 55, at 181 (describing how film theory can be integrated 
into the existing legal framework); Jessica Silbey, Judges as Film Critics:  New Approaches to 
Filmic Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 506, 540–41, 561–62, 570 (2004) [hereinafter 
Silbey, Judges as Film Critics] (discussing problems with accepting film evidence as 
substantive proof of a material fact); Jessica Silbey, Persuasive Visions:  Film and Memory, 
2012 L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 1, 4, 6–9 (2012) [hereinafter Silbey, Persuasive Visions] 
(discussing the self-critiquing nature of film). 
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interpretation)?  And how do different audiences see, read, and make 
sense of images (critical race and reception theories)?  In addition, we 
should ask how images are given meaning by placing them in different 
contexts or weaving them into larger social and political discourses.  
Lastly, we should reverse these questions to ask what the image does not 
show and how the image might fail to answer the material legal 
questions in any given case. 
The image is excessive in its realities, its fictions, and in the medium 
itself.  It shows us more than we can absorb and less than we hope.  Its 
excess helps explain both the probative and prejudicial qualities of the 
image.  As the image comes to serve as evidence, it provides so much 
information that we must be especially careful to recognize what 
information it does not provide.  Its excesses tend to mask its limitations.  
The image presents an “orgy of evidence.”  This phrase comes from a 
scene in Minority Report, when the main character—and the audience—
comes across a bed strewn with photographs.58  They are almost 
immediately comprehensible to the viewer, but we later learn that we 
have not comprehended them properly.  Indeed, we are told we should 
have been suspicious of this “orgy of evidence” precisely because it 
appeared to tell us exactly what we wanted to know.  It is no accident 
that the orgy of evidence in the film is comprised of images.  Particularly 
when seen in an environment like the courtroom—comprised of texts 
and documents—images appear to provide more powerful and direct 
access to facts and events.59  Because the image gives us so much 
information, it tends to seduce us into thinking that it is also the 
information we need.  It can be easy to forget that there are crucial 
questions it may fail to answer.  Each time the image is used as evidence, 
we must be sure to ask, “evidence of what?” 
                                                 
58 Synopsis for Minority Report, supra note 20. 
59 SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 78–79 (“Video appeared as a window onto events rather 
than as one evidentiary medium among others.”). 
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An Orgy of Evidence:  Minority Report (Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corporation 2002) 
B. Rodney King and Minority Reporting 
What might it mean to take minority reports seriously, especially if 
“minority” also carries its racial meaning and we apply the insights of 
critical race theory?  The video of Rodney King’s beating by Los Angeles 
police officers is a ready-made example as well as a crucial moment in 
the history of video evidence more broadly.  This video is one of the 
earliest, and certainly the most famous, instances of the now common 
linkage between law, video, and racial violence.  In 1991, after a high-
speed chase, Rodney King was beaten by Los Angeles Police Department 
Officers, and most of the incident was captured on videotape by George 
Holliday, a local resident who filmed the scene from his balcony.60  It 
was the video—broadcasted nationally on network television before 
Internet use was common—showing police beating a black man, helpless 
on the ground, that ignited widespread anger about police brutality 
against African Americans.  The broadcast of that video turned the 
subsequent criminal trial into a national event and the acquittal of the 
officers into a regional riot.61  Most television viewers—whether white or 
black—felt that the video spoke for itself and that it showed racially 
                                                 
60 The Learning Network, May 1, 1992:  Rodney King Asks, ‘Can We All Get Along?,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (May 1, 2012, 4:08 AM), http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/may-1-
1992-victim-rodney-kings-asks-can-we-all-get-along/?_r=0. 
61 Id. 
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charged excessive force on the part of the police.62  This faith in images 
was shared by prosecutors, who made the video their central piece of 
evidence at trial.63  “The force of the Holiday [sic] tape’s testimonial 
appearance on television, outside the courtroom, led the prosecution to 
assume that the tape would speak for itself in court.”64 
 
Still from Rodney King Video 
 
The defense’s ability to interrogate and re-interpret the video images 
is widely credited with its victory.65  In response to the public and 
prosecutorial faith in the video’s ability to speak for itself, defense 
attorneys broke up and transformed the video into slow-motion 
movements, stills, and fractions of body parts to present a visual 
counter-narrative of the event.66  That counter-narrative relied on 
                                                 
62 SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 107 (noting that a Los Angeles Times poll taken a week 
after the event showed that ninety-two percent of city residents believed the police used 
excessive force); Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 DENV. U.L. 
REV. 283, 291 (1993). 
63 Seth Mydans, Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in Taped Beating, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 
1992), http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/02/08/home/rodney-verdict.html. 
64 SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 118. 
65 See, e.g., Mydans, supra note 63 (attributing the officers’ acquittal to the defense’s use 
of the videotape showing King being beaten). 
66 Walter Goodman, Critic’s Notebook; Defendants Contend with Video, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 
1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/11/news/critic-s-notebook-defendants-
contend-with-video.html. Defendants also testified to events which happened outside the 
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unearthing crucial visual details that were not visible in the real-time 
video, suggesting that the experience of watching the video as a whole 
was actually misleading.  This most basic technique of visual 
interrogation, breaking down the image into a selection of isolated 
details, certainly seems to “contradict the judicial faith in images.”67  The 
technique disrupts the standard claim of the film image as a perfect 
representation that allows the viewer to effectively see the event with her 
own eyes and deprives the image of much of its emotional force.  
Breaking down the image into its constituent frames in order to reframe 
it does not, however, displace the image as a truth object.  This standard 
technique of the sports replay merely suggests that sometimes the truth 
requires technological evidence.  At most, it simply allows a different 
narrative about “the truth” of what the video shows.68  The jury 
acquitted the officers involved in the Rodney King beating because the 
defense employed a more sophisticated visual literacy.  It did not make 
them right, but it made them better lawyers. 
How might prosecutors have used visual literacy to present the 
video or respond to the counter-narrative?  One approach would have 
been to mimic the defense technique by unearthing details that 
supported their case or showing why the technique itself was 
misleading.  Another possibility would have been to speak for the video 
by explaining why people were right to see it as excessive force by police.  
In this instance, being willing to name race and narrate minority 
experience is a form of visual interpretation; it highlights the role of 
context, audience, and perception, and gives meaning to the image by 
placing it in a larger discourse.  In the context of many excessive force 
and civil rights cases against police, part of the minority report is often 
the unspoken but implicit discourse of race and power.  As Kimberle 
Crenshaw and Gary Peller have argued with respect to the Rodney King 
video:  “Both the perception of the tape as showing a “reasonable 
exercise of force” and the perception of the tape as showing “racist 
brutality” depend, not simply on the physiology of visual perception, 
but rather on interpretation, on the mediation of perception with 
background narratives that give visual images meaning.”69  Crenshaw 
and Peller argue that crucial to understanding the perception of the 
video is the background reality and lived experience of racism in which 
                                                                                                             
frame before the video began to help mute the power of the video.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 
42, at 118–19. 
67 Piyel Haldar, Law and the Evidential Image, 4 L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 139, 140 (2008). 
68 But see id. at 151–54 (arguing that details of evidential images are like psychoanalytic 
symptoms or textual gaps that once unmoored as detail no longer function as “an object of 
representation and . . . resist[] the mimetic basis upon which testimony and proof rest”). 
69 Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 62, at 292. 
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countless ordinary victims of police brutality never bring claims because 
there is no video to give them even a fighting chance of success.70 
Another critical race approach to visual interpretation is offered by 
Judith Butler who, in her reading of the Rodney King video and trial, 
argues that visibility itself is already racially saturated.71  For Butler, the 
only way to explain how a video of a man surrounded and brutally 
beaten by police can come to be seen as a video of a man who is himself 
the source of danger and control is by taking account of how white 
people’s perception of black bodies is already pre-loaded with racial 
meaning. 
This is not a simple seeing, an act of direct perception, 
but the racial production of the visible, the workings of 
racial constraints on what it means to “see.”  Indeed, the 
trial calls to be read not only as instruction in racist 
modes of seeing but as a repeated and ritualistic 
production of blackness . . . .72 
A visual jurisprudence informed by racially informed minority reports 
would explore, as Butler and critical race theorists do, the many ways in 
which visuality, like law itself, “is not neutral to the question of race” but 
participates in the creation of racial knowledge and judgment.73 
IV.  THREE ENCOUNTERS WITH THE IMAGE 
I turn now to three judicial encounters between law and the image.  
The examples are all different uses of filmic evidence at summary 
judgment where what is at stake is the right to trial.  I begin with Scott v. 
Harris before discussing the more recent cases of Gilfand v. Planey and 
McDowell v. Sherrer.  Each case takes a slightly different approach to how 
they link up video images with key legal questions, though all share 
missed opportunities for employing techniques of visual interpretion.  
The video evidence I am looking at is all documentary, or what Jessica 
Silbey would call “evidence verité.”74  There is no argument that the 
images have been consciously altered or manipulated in any way.  It is 
precisely because this type of evidence is potentially deeply probative, 
                                                 
70 Id. at 293. 
71 Judith Butler, Endangered/Endangering:  Schematic Racism and White Paranoia, in 
READING RODNEY KING:  READING URBAN UPRISING 15, 16 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 
1993). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 17. 
74 Silbey, Evidence Verité, supra note 57, at 1257. 
Mezey: The Image Cannot Speak for Itself:  Film, Summary Judgment, and V
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
22 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
and seems to invite the viewer to suspend critical judgment in the face of 
the authority of the image, that it inspires the least interrogation and 
presents the hardest kind of case.  I use these cases to explore the ways of 
seeing they produce and to reconsider how documentary visual evidence 
might be more fully interrogated and narrated using a critical visual 
literacy. 
A. Scott v. Harris 
Others have written well about Scott v. Harris,75 but the case is 
instructive for the argument I want to make, and at the moment it is the 
most powerful legal precedent on the use and import of visual evidence.  
As noted earlier, the question in Scott was whether Officer Scott used 
excessive force by pushing Victor Harris’s car off the road in order to end 
a high-speed chase, causing his car to flip and leaving him a quadriplegic 
at age nineteen.76  Harris was clocked speeding on a road in suburban 
Georgia by Officer Reynolds.77  When Harris failed to pull over and 
attempted to flee, Reynolds gave chase.78  Part way through the chase, 
Officer Scott joined in and asked to take the lead.79  Officer Scott was not 
aware of the underlying offense when he asked and was given 
permission to force Harris off the road.80  Part of the evidence introduced 
were the two videos taken by the cameras mounted on Reynolds’ and 
Scott’s police cars; these cameras began recording automatically when 
the siren and lights went on.81 
The officers moved for summary judgment on Harris’s claim of 
excessive use of force, and in considering the motion, the federal district 
court had to determine whether there was a genuine factual dispute 
about whether Officer Scott’s actions were objectively reasonable under 
the circumstances.82  As noted earlier, the federal rules allow a judge to 
grant summary judgment in a case where there is insufficient factual 
                                                 
75 See, e.g., FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 18, at 36–49 (discussing the role played by 
two digital videos in Scott v. Harris); Silbey, supra note 56, at 18–19, 24–25 (discussing the 
treatment of video footage in Scott v. Harris as substantive evidence). 
76 Supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
77 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2007).  According to the record, the county deputy 
clocked Harris as traveling seventy-three miles per hour in a fifty-five-mile-per-hour speed 
limit.  Id. 
78 Id. at 374–75. 
79 Id. at 375. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 391 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
82 Harris v. Coweta Cnty., Ga., No. CIVA 3:01CV148 WBH, 2003 WL 25419527, at *1, *4 
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub 
nom. Scott, 550 U.S. 372. 
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disagreement on an essential element and the fact-finding function of the 
jury is unnecessary.83  Because the burden for demonstrating the absence 
of a genuine issue is on the party moving for summary judgment,84 
courts view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment.85  Courts often frame the inquiry by importing the 
same question that is asked later on a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law:  whether a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.86 
Applying this standard, the district court concluded that there was 
sufficient disagreement in the record about whether the chase posed a 
serious threat to public safety that a reasonable jury could find for 
Harris; in other words, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury 
could find that Officer Scott’s actions were not objectively reasonable but 
rather an excessive use of force, thus rendering summary judgment 
inappropriate.87  The court noted that it was influenced by the fact that 
“prior to Reynolds’ decision to instigate a high-speed chase, Harris’s 
only crime was driving 73 miles per hour in a 55 miles-per-hour zone.”88  
It then considered additional aspects of the record: 
 Defendants argue that the crash in the parking lot 
between Harris’s car and Scott’s cruiser demonstrated 
that Harris presented a significant danger to others.  
Viewing the facts in Harris’s favor, however, it appears 
that either Scott hit Harris, or that the crash was an 
accident.  According to the official report submitted by 
Sgt. Mark Brown of the Peachtree City Police 
Department as well as the testimony of Harris, Scott 
rammed Harris’s car.  These facts rebut Defendants’ 
assertion that Harris aggressively used his vehicle to 
strike Scott’s cruiser.  Additionally, the decision to ram 
the vehicle came minutes later, when Harris was driving 
away from officers, and when there were no other 
motorists or pedestrians nearby, thus casting doubt on 
Defendants’ assertion that at the time of the ramming, 
Harris posed an immediate threat of harm to others.  
Finally, the Court has also considered the fact that the 
                                                 
83 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see supra text accompanying notes 12–15 (considering how the 
Supreme Court of the United States altered the summary judgment standard in Scott v. 
Harris). 
84 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
85 United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). 
86 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
87 Harris, 2003 WL 25419527 at *5. 
88 Id. 
Mezey: The Image Cannot Speak for Itself:  Film, Summary Judgment, and V
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
24 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
officers had the license plate number for Harris’s 
vehicle, and the vehicle had not been reported stolen.  
Reasonable officers, therefore, would have known that 
they could have followed up on the license plate 
information at a later time.89 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of summary 
judgment.90 
Writing for eight Justices of the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia subtly, 
but significantly, used the videotape to revise the summary judgment 
standard, shifting it away from a fact-intensive inquiry based on the 
entire record and conducted primarily at the district court level, at least 
when there is persuasive visual evidence.  The Court noted that, while 
motions for summary judgment usually require the court to view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and that in 
qualified immunity cases this means adopting the plaintiff’s version of 
the facts, an undoctored videotape changes the summary judgment 
equation:  “There is, however, an added wrinkle in this case:  existence in 
the record of a videotape capturing the events in question.  There are no 
allegations or indications that this videotape was doctored or altered in 
any way, nor any contention that what it depicts differs from what 
actually happened.”91  
For the Scott majority, the videotape showed an unmediated reality 
of “what actually happened,”92 one they felt allowed them to view the 
events with their own eyes.93  This conviction, that undoctored 
documentary videotapes are not subject to alternative interpretations 
and can therefore resolve all disputes over material facts, appears to alter 
the traditional summary judgment analysis.  “Respondent’s version of 
events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury 
could have believed him.  The Court of Appeals should not have relied 
on such visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by 
the videotape.”94  Viewing the facts in the light depicted by a police video 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 Harris v. Coweta Cnty, Ga., 433 F.3d 807, 821–22 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated and 
superseded on reh’g, 406 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 
(2007). 
91 Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. 
92 Id. 
93 Justice Breyer in oral argument asserted that “[i]f the [lower] court says that isn’t what 
happened, and I see with my eyes that is what happened, what am I supposed to do?”  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Scott, 550 U.S. 372 (No. 05-1631), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-1631.pdf. 
94 Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81 (emphasis added).  The phrase “visible fiction” is richly ironic 
in this context.  Justice Scalia must mean the apparent fiction of assuming Harris’s version 
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is indeed a new wrinkle in summary judgment; it displaces the 
presumption in favor of the non-moving party and implicitly asks the 
court to weigh the rest of the record against “the truth” of the videotape.  
Moreover, this revision of summary judgment has been widely adopted 
by courts of appeals.95 
The Court’s approach in Scott not only disrupts the summary 
judgment standard but likewise ignores the venerable tradition of a 
judicial commitment to the rule of law through giving reasons.96  At a 
minimum, giving reasons means explaining why one argument is more 
persuasive than another or making the case for why one way of seeing 
makes more sense than another.  One cannot simply say, “your way of 
seeing makes no sense; mine is better.”  Despite Justice Stevens’ dissent 
and the two lower court judgments, the Scott majority does not even 
concede there are other ways of viewing the video.97  Justice Scalia 
disparaged the court of appeals’ assertion that Harris did not pose a 
serious threat to others:  “[R]eading the lower court’s opinion, one gets 
the impression that respondent, rather than fleeing from police, was 
attempting to pass his driving test.”98  The one affirmative claim for the 
majority’s reading of the video relies on a visual referent of the most 
fictional sort—the Hollywood movie:  “what we see on the video more 
closely resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening 
                                                                                                             
of the facts in the face of visible evidence to the contrary; but, he misses the ironic 
possibility that the visible evidence might also induce fictions of its own. 
95 See, e.g., Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding that the 
forensic evidence offered did not so utterly discredit the testimony that a reasonable jury 
could not believe the version of events); Austin v. Redford Twp. Police Dep’t, 690 F.3d 490, 
493 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that Scott allows the court of appeals to overlook the evidence 
accepted by the district court to the extent that in the “‘light depicted by the videotape’” the 
evidence is “‘blatantly contradicted’” (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81)); Carnaby v. City of 
Hous., 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the plaintiff’s version of facts need 
not be relied upon, and the standard of review must simply be “‘the facts in the light 
depicted by the videotape’” (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 381)); Wallingford v. Olson, 592 F.3d 
888, 892 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the videotape evidence contradicted plaintiff’s version 
of events and thus the court must view the evidence “‘in the light depicted by the 
videotape’” (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 381)). 
96 This commitment to giving reasons is evident in many contexts, such as the Legal 
Process version embodied in “reasoned elaboration.”  See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:  BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION 
OF LAW 161, 165–68 (Cambridge Tentative ed. 1958); see also G. Edward White, The Evolution 
of Reasoned Elaboration:  Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973) 
(providing a history of “[r]easoned [e]laboration”). 
97 I have conducted an exercise based on Scott v. Harris with hundreds of civil procedure 
students, and there is always dramatic disagreement on whether the video allows for 
summary judgment. 
98 Scott, 550 U.S. at 378–79. 
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sort, placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk of 
serious injury.”99 
By not differentiating between the chase, different narratives of the 
chase, and a visual representation of the chase, the Justices enhanced 
their own powers of sight and judgment.  They were not only convinced 
that the video had a ready-made meaning entirely apart from their own 
perceptions—that it spoke for itself—but that this indisputable meaning 
so thoroughly contradicted all competing facts in the record that they 
could decide the summary judgment question themselves without 
remand to the district court.100  The record before the Court did not 
consist of the video alone, but for the majority, the persuasive power of 
the video trumped everything else in the record.  This suggested that 
such video evidence can function as a meta-fact through which all other 
facts should be viewed and evaluated rather than as yet another piece of 
evidence subject to competing interpretations.  Based on this 
understanding, the Court held that the “reality” of the video showed that 
the car chase posed so substantial a risk of injury to others that no 
reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.101 
The common law, in particular, has a long tradition of minority 
reports—they are the dissenting opinions in which alternative 
interpretations are incorporated into the law.  Justice Stevens, writing in 
dissent, offered alternative arguments that he believed could have 
formed the basis of a reasonable jury decision.  From Justice Stevens’ 
perspective, the video provided evidence that supported Harris’s version 
of the facts and that, in conjunction with other parts of the record, made 
it much less clear whether there was a serious risk of injury to the police 
or the public.102  He noted facts not mentioned by the majority—like the 
fact that police had already blocked off many intersections, Harris never 
drove in the opposite lane, when Harris could not pass a car in front of 
him safely, he slowed down, and when he did pass he used his turn 
signal.103  Stevens further chides his “colleagues on the jury” for 
speculating about the facts and substituting the summary judgment 
posture with its own reading of the video.104  Justice Stevens’ dissent 
demonstrates a more sophisticated visual literacy by recognizing that the 
video images are potentially ambiguous, require interpretation, and 
belong to a larger factual record.  It also demonstrates a firmer 
                                                 
99 Id. at 380. 
100 Id. at 380–81. 
101 Id. at 378, 380. 
102 Id. at 390–94 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. at 391–92. 
104 Id. at 392, 394. 
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commitment to the traditional posture of summary judgment.  Yet even 
Justice Stevens was tempted into believing that the video told a material 
truth, even if it was a different truth than the one the majority insisted 
on, when he insisted that the video “actually confirms, rather than 
contradicts, the lower courts’ appraisal of the factual questions at 
issue.”105  That is a version of the seduction of excessive visual data—that 
it seems to confirm far more than it possibly can. 
One way in which the Scott majority displayed a pronounced visual 
illiteracy was in assuming that the video showed them precisely what 
they were looking for.  At issue in Scott was whether the chase posed 
such a threat to public safety that Officer Scott’s actions were objectively 
reasonable and therefore did not constitute excessive force as a matter of 
law.106  While the video shows us many things and is potentially 
probative on many issues involving the chase, one thing that it does not 
clearly show is how dangerous the chase was and, therefore, whether 
Officer Scott’s actions were reasonable to protect other drivers.  We can 
fill in missing details from what we might know about car chases, 
although that knowledge is itself mostly the product of visual fictions 
such as movies and television shows.  We can also surmise from other 
facts available in the record, which Justice Stevens does in his dissent,107 
but the images do not tell us much about the danger the chase posed for 
others.  It is very hard to tell from the video whether the other traffic is 
stopped or moving or how close Harris and the police are to the other 
cars.  We do not know if the area was likely to have pedestrians or which 
intersections were already blocked off.  More generally, we do not know 
under what conditions police should give chase in the first instance.  For 
all the video shows, it does not provide much evidence about “the 
circumstances” from which courts are to determine reasonableness.  In 
the face of the orgy of evidence that the video provides, all the Justices 
fail to appreciate what the video is unable to say. 
So what might a critical and visually literate reading of the videotape 
in Scott look like?  For starters, the video could be considered in light of 
the techniques of visual interpretation I have discussed, asking how the 
medium, the viewing context, and the audience might inform or distort 
our perception.  For example, the dash-cam video places the viewer in 
the position of the police.  Given the placement of the shot, these videos 
do not quite put the viewer in the driver’s seat but on the hood of the 
                                                 
105 Id. at 390. 
106 See supra text accompanying notes 87–94 (discussing the issue and standard 
articulated in Scott). 
107 Supra text accompanying note 102. 
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squad car,108 implicitly asking the audience to see the images from the 
perspective of law enforcement.  Even if we recognize this influence, it is 
hard to escape it for it is part of how these images create their own ways 
of seeing, and we have no alternative perspectives.  One need only 
imagine how different a video taken from the back of Harris’s car, from 
the side of the road, or from a helicopter might look to appreciate how 
differently each would capture the scene.  To the extent Scott reframes 
excessive force cases in light of the video, it titlts the view of the events in 
favor of the police. 
Similarly, the dash-cam technology determines and limits the frame 
in part because we do not have the field of vision or a sense of the 
periphery we would have if we were in the squad car.  The lack of color, 
the distorted lights, and the sounds of the police radio all influence our 
perception.  And with respect to the frame, one should always ask:  
What can’t be seen?  What is happening off-camera?  Is it important? 
In this case, what is going on at the edge and outside the frame 
seems very important.  At a minimum we might want to know how 
much traffic there was, if it was stopped, and what the road conditions 
were, in order to assess the dangers the chase posed.  Presented with 
evidentiary images, one should also ask:  How were the images selected?  
Why do they begin and end where they do?  Here, there were two 
pursuing police cars and two separate videos.  Were both considered in 
their entirety?  For example, the collision between Harris and Scott in the 
shopping center looks very different in the two videos.  The one taken 
from Scott’s car makes it look as though Scott turned his cruiser into 
Harris’s car in order to stop him.  Likewise, the viewing environment—
in a courthouse in Georgia or Washington, D.C., in a classroom, or on 
YouTube—and who the viewers are, especially their experience with and 
assumptions about police, changes the way the video is seen. 
In their excellent discussion of the Scott case, Feigenson and Spiesel 
accuse the majority of naïve realism—the belief that the images spoke the 
truth about the chase and that the words Justice Scalia used to translate 
the images into a judicial opinion could forestall further dispute about 
their meaning.109  They note that, while posting the videos on the 
Supreme Court website was evidence of the Court’s naïve conviction 
that everyone would come to the same conclusion, those images have 
had the opposite effect.110  “Because we can watch the same material 
ourselves, however, the Court’s opinion fails to constrain our view.  Its 
                                                 
108 See FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 18, at 40 (suggesting that the point of view of the 
camera is not exactly the driver of the car but the player of a video game). 
109 Id. at 48. 
110 Id. at 46. 
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decision becomes less convincing, more subject to question, because of 
discrepancies between what we can see and what we are told to see.  The 
pictures continue to speak.”111  While I agree that the popularization of 
legal images allows those images to see and speak in multiple and 
continually evolving ways, I want to reiterate that the images cannot do 
so by themselves.  Images themselves cannot determine their reception 
by their myriad viewers whose perceptions are always informed by their 
individual experiences and interpretive positions.112 
B. Gilfand v. Planey 
The fact that a video is part of the record on a motion for summary 
judgment does not mean it will always be read by the court to support 
summary judgment, even in the context of excessive use of force cases in 
which there is often a motion for summary judgment brought by the 
defending officers.  Widespread visual illiteracy within the law suggests 
that courts will read visual evidence poorly, over-estimating what it does 
say and under-estimating what it does not say, but it does not tell us 
which way these misreadings cut in a case.  In Gilfand v. Planey,113 a 
federal district court judge in Chicago, Illinois relied primarily on 
multiple videos recorded by a bar’s security cameras to deny summary 
judgment.114  In this instance, a lack of visual literacy did not jeopardize 
the plaintiffs’ right to a jury, but it perpetuated the notion that images 
speak for themselves and, in doing so, contributed to an erosion of a 
fulsome summary judgment assessment in which the record is 
considered as a whole. 
The Gilfand dispute arose at a Chicago bar called the Jefferson Tap 
around 3:30 a.m. as the bar was closing.115  Brothers Barry and Aaron 
Gilfand were playing pool with two friends while a handful of off-duty 
police officers were nearby at the bar.116  There is no evidence on how the 
conflict began beyond the conflicting testimony of the parties about 
exchanged insults, and, as the court notes, the issue is not dispositive of 
                                                 
111 Id. at 48.  Feigenson and Spiesel also make the important point that the Supreme Court 
altered the videotapes without mentioning this fact on the website.  See id. at 46 (pointing 
out the differences between the online video and the one submitted in evidence and 
implying that these differences were not mentioned on the website). 
112 See Dan M. Kahan et al., supra note 24, at 897, 903 (stating that what a video shows 
depends on its viewer and that the viewer’s cultural and other ideological commitments 
help him see the video in a particular way). 
113 No. 07 C 2566, 2011 WL 4036110 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2011). 
114 Id. at *1. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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an excessive use of force claim.117  What is relatively clear is that the off-
duty officers forcibly ended the pool game and violently confronted the 
plaintiffs.118  By the end of the fight, Aaron Gilfand had a broken nose, 
and both Barry Gilfand and plaintiff Scott Lowrance may have suffered 
physical injuries from being attacked by defendants.119  Based on the 
events in the bar, plaintiffs brought an excessive use of force claim 
against the officers and the City of Chicago, a failure to intervene claim 
against the same defendants and a number of responding officers, as 
well as various state law claims.120  All the defendants moved for 
summary judgment on all counts.121 
As in Scott v. Harris, the videos appear to have assumed an outsized 
role in the assessment of the evidence.  After viewing the videos taken 
from at least three different security cameras, the judge narrated what he 
was able to see, including a good deal of violence against plaintiffs both 
inside and outside the bar.122  He concluded that not only should the 
summary judgment motions be denied but that they were “overreaching 
attempts to redefine the legal standards for summary judgment” in the 
face of “copious video evidence [that] shows the Defendant Officers 
fighting with Plaintiffs.”123  In support of their motion, defendants 
pointed to numerous inconsistent or implausible statements made by 
plaintiffs and some evidence that Barry Gilfand did not suffer any 
injury.124  In the face of conflicting evidence that suggests a genuine issue 
of material fact, it is undoubtedly right to deny summary judgment.  My 
concern is not with the finding that summary judgment was improper 
but that it was improper because the video was self-evident and its very 
clarity allowed it to trump conflicting evidence.  According to the judge, 
the relevant “portions of the video . . . speak for themselves.”125 
Noteworthy in Gilfand is the relationship between video and other 
evidence.  The defendants sought to argue that their supporting evidence 
so clearly refuted plaintiffs’ evidence that the motion should be 
granted.126  More than once, however, the court insisted that other pieces 
of the record cannot “erase [the] video evidence,”127 and it even implied 
                                                 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at *1–2. 
119 Id. at *3–5. 
120 Id. at *4. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. at *5. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 n.5 (2007)). 
126 Id. at *6. 
127 Id. at *5–6. 
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that video evidence may be able to refute other sources of evidence, but 
it is unlikely to work in reverse: 
Defendants argue that the evidence outside of the video 
contradicts Plaintiffs’ story to such an extent that a 
ruling of summary judgment in their favor is warranted.  
Contrary to their argument, Scott v. Harris does not 
support their Motions.  In Scott, the Supreme Court used 
a video that showed the respondent driving so fast and 
recklessly that the video clearly refuted the respondent’s 
argument that he did not drive in a manner that 
endangered human life. . . .  The record does not so 
blatantly contradict Plaintiffs’ story so as to preclude 
such a jury verdict.128 
In a sense, this confusion over the summary judgment standard—a 
confusion that the court in Gilfand attributes to defendants129—is the 
logical extension of the confusion sowed by Scott v. Harris where unclear 
facts and conflicting interpretations are represented not as genuine 
issues of fact but as irrefutable visual evidence. 
Unlike Scott, greater visual literacy in Gilfand would have been 
unlikely to change the outcome, but it could have certainly helped to 
minimize rather than perpetuate the ongoing confusion about the role of 
video evidence at summary judgment.  A small portion of the video 
evidence that the Gilfand court considered is available on the Internet.130  
It shows many of the acts of force that the court described in its order; 
yet, applying the techniques of visual interpretation, I have suggested, 
illuminate other things that ought to be taken into account.  For one, the 
security cameras here are elevated above the scene, so that the viewer is 
not watching the action from the perspective of any participant but in a 
position of a detached observer.  As is common with security cameras, 
the image quality is not good and there is no audio.  The elevated angle 
also tends to obscure some of the action that takes place on the floor.  
The various camera shots capture many parts of the bar and the sidewalk 
out front, but they do not necessarily capture important aspects of the 
                                                 
128 Id. at *6 (citation omitted). 
129 Id. (“Defendants ask the Court to create a novel standard for summary 
judgment . . . .”); supra text accompanying note 124. 
130 ChicagoCopwatch, Men Beaten by Chicago Cops Were ‘Defenseless,’ YOUTUBE (Mar. 23, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9ZIGsLJqdo. 
Mezey: The Image Cannot Speak for Itself:  Film, Summary Judgment, and V
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
32 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
action, and in some key moments the fighting occurs outside the frame 
entirely.131 
In addition, the court says nothing about how the images were 
selected and by whom, so we do not know whose judgment determined 
which images were considered relevant.  The portions of the video 
online are embedded in a news program, so a television producer made 
the selection available to the public and for purposes quite distinct from 
those animating civil discovery.132  Relatedly, the context in which the 
public can view the videos, with the reporter’s voiceover about the case, 
presents a dramatically different viewing context than the environment 
in which the judge viewed the videos or in which the jury watched them 
once the case went to trial.133 
As always, the experiences, attitudes, and perspectives of each 
viewer also inform the way any image is perceived.  I offer these 
additional readings of slices of the video images to model a very basic 
visual literacy, to show the ways in which the videos in this case could 
not speak for themselves, and to illuminate how the judicial assumption 
that they could speak for themselves perpetuated the confusion about 
the legal standard for summary judgment inherited from Scott v. Harris. 
C. McDowell v. Sherrer 
Lastly, I want to highlight another recent case, in which there were 
two videos and two competing court interpretations, to show how even 
when the visual evidence itself is contradictory, judges lacking a critical 
visual literacy can still insist that the images speak for themselves.  
However, in this case there is interpretive tension between the two 
different videos and between the trial and appellate courts, and in this 
interpretive tension is the promise of different ways of seeing and 
reading legal images. 
In McDowell v. Sherrer,134 two inmates at the Northern State Prison in 
New Jersey—Steven McDowell and Carlos Cruz—were released from 
their cell in the early morning hours of November 8, 2004, after 
complaints that Cruz was ill and vomiting.135  After their release, events 
                                                 
131 Gilfand, 2011 WL 4036110, at *2–3 (noting that the fight in the vestibule as well as other 
incidents were not captured by the security cameras at all). 
132 See ChicagoCopwatch, supra note 130. 
133 See Verdict in Jefferson Tap Civil Case Faults 4 Officers for Brawl, CBS CHI. (May 18, 2012, 
7:27 PM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/05/18/verdict-in-jefferson-tap-civil-case-
faults-4-officers-for-brawl/ (reporting that plaintiffs recovered more than $33,000 from the 
officers in the federal civil trial). 
134 No. 04-6089 (KSH), 2008 WL 4542475, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2008), rev’d in part, 374 F. 
App’x 288 (3d Cir. 2010). 
135 Id. at *3. 
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become unclear.  The State claimed that both inmates were immediately 
violent and had feigned illness to be released.136  McDowell and Cruz 
claimed that they were seeking medical attention but conceded that they 
did not submit to handcuffing and did not return to their cell.137  In 
response, prison guards formed heavily armed “extraction teams” to 
corral the two inmates, remove them from the “tier,” and forcibly put 
them back in their cell.138  The question before the court was whether 
McDowell’s excessive force claim could be dismissed on summary 
judgment.139  Much like the flight in Scott v. Harris, cell extraction invites 
a police response, but even where plaintiff’s conduct begins the 
exchange with correctional officers, the officers are under a 
constitutional obligation to avoid excessive force.140 
In McDowell, the interaction between the inmates and the extraction 
teams was caught on film by two different cameras, one in the hands of 
another inmate, Omar Broadway,141 and the other used by prison 
officials to film the cell extraction.142  The district court order on the 
State’s motion for summary judgment represents a clear articulation of 
the power of video evidence:  “If a picture is worth a thousand words, 
two live-action videos are good for at least a million.”143 Relying on Scott 
v. Harris, the district court assumed that the presence of video evidence 
augmented the summary judgment standard and quoted a long passage 
from Scott to show “how the preexisting summary judgment framework 
must accommodate video evidence.”144  Even with multiple and 
contradictory videos, the judge believed the visual evidence allowed her 
to witness the event in person.  The district court noted that “the 
                                                 
136 McDowell v. Sheerer [sic], 374 Fed. App’x 288, 290–91 (3d Cir. 2010), rev’g in part, No. 
04-6089 (KSH), 2008 WL 4542475 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2008). 
137 Id. 
138 McDowell, 2008 WL 4542475, at *3–4. 
139 Id. at *1. 
140 See id. at *11 (“Where a prisoner alleges that officers used excessive force upon him, 
‘the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and 
suffering ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a good faith efort [sic] to maintain 
or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’” (quoting 
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)).  In this case, the district court conceded that the 
officers used significant force but found it significant that “McDowell and Cruz, as 
revealed by the videos, had visibly taunted corrections officers, flouted prison rules and 
disobeyed commands, shielded themselves from pepper spray, and had further invited a 
violent confrontation.”  Id. at *12. 
141 Id. at *5.  Broadway’s recordings, including excerpts of the video at issue in McDowell, 
became a documentary film about prison violence entitled, An Omar Broadway Film.  Id. at 
*5 n.3; AN OMAR BROADWAY FILM (4th Row Films 2008). 
142 McDowell, 2008 WL 4542475, at *4. 
143 Id. at *1. 
144 Id. at *1–2. 
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[ordinary summary judgment] standards are challenging enough.  Here, 
however, the Court has before it two videos . . . and therefore must apply 
the governing summary judgment standards having witnessed with its 
own eyes the events at the core of this litigation.”145  Once a judge believes 
herself to be a witness, it becomes extremely difficult to apply a 
summary judgment standard that asks the trial court not to weigh the 
evidence, view it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
and dispassionately assess whether a reasonable jury could find for that 
party. 
Indeed, the district court’s reading of the videos evinces the 
difficulty of being both witness and judge.  Repeatedly throughout the 
order, the court found that the videos ‘“blatantly contradict[],”’ “flatly 
contradict[],” and “manifestly disprove[]” evidence supporting 
plaintiff’s version of events while “revealing” what actually happened.146  
Rather than viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
McDowell, the court used the videos to discount plaintiff’s allegations of 
what occurred by referring to them as a “story spun” and a “tale.”147  The 
court concluded that “the videos contradict the entire tenor of 
McDowell’s account.”148 
The Third Circuit’s opinion,149 in contrast, disagreed with the district 
court not only over what the videos said but how they should be read in 
light of the summary judgment standard.  In reversing the district court, 
the Third Circuit concluded that because “neither of the videos ‘blatantly 
contradict[s]’ McDowell’s account such that no reasonable jury could 
believe it,” summary judgment was improper.150  One key difference 
between the courts’ analyses with respect to summary judgment is that 
the court of appeals made a point of noting the portions of the videos 
that appeared to support McDowell’s account: 
In both videos, McDowell can be heard yelling “I am not 
resisting” when he is underneath the officers.  Second, 
the video recorded by the inmate shows that an officer 
who was standing near McDowell’s body did have a 
nightstick in his hand—consistent with McDowell’s 
testimony that he was hit in the head repeatedly by 
nightsticks.  Additionally, when McDowell is led away 
                                                 
145 Id. at *1. 
146 Id. at *12–13, *16. 
147 Id. at *12–13. 
148 Id. at *15. 
149 McDowell v. Sheerer [sic], 374 F. App’x 288, 292–93 (3d Cir. 2010), rev’g in part, No. 04-
6089 (KSH), 2008 WL 4542475 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2008). 
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from the tier, his face is covered with blood, suggesting 
that he suffered an injury during the extraction.  As 
McDowell is led off the tier floor, an officer has his arm 
around McDowell’s neck and McDowell is pressed 
against the wall.  The officers thereafter lay McDowell to 
the ground, as if he is not able to stand on his own.  
These events are consistent with McDowell’s testimony 
that he was choked until he was unconscious.151 
The fundamental difference between the courts is in their approach 
to visual interpretation.  The Third Circuit’s analysis was noteworthy not 
for its sophistication in reading the images but for its interpretive 
restraint and lack of credulity.  The court of appeals admitted that while 
the videos showed McDowell and Cruz yelling at the officers, it was 
“unable to determine from the videos whether McDowell [was] resisting 
the officers or to determine the amount of force used on him. . . . because 
McDowell [was] forced to the ground early in the confrontation, and the 
view of his body is completely obstructed.”152  The court employed the 
kernels of a visual literacy when it recognized what the camera does and 
does not show.  The camera, the Third Circuit noted, “simply do[es] not 
show what happened during these crucial moments.”153  In this way, the 
court of appeals’ order is based on different premises with respect to 
both the legal standard and visual interpretation, rejecting the district 
court’s over-reliance on both the image and the Supreme Court decision 
in Scott.154  The Third Circuit recognized that the camera is often severely 
limited with respect to the exact questions courts must answer and that 
even witnessing something “with our own eyes” can be complicated if 
we cannot really see what is happening. 
The appellate court’s analysis would have been stronger had it 
employed the techniques of visual interpretation for which I have 
argued.  The only publicly available excerpts of the video evidence in 
McDowell are on YouTube and incorporated into a trailer for An Omar 
Broadway Film,155 a film that was screened at the 2008 Tribeca Film 
                                                 
151 Id. at 293. 
152 Id. at 292–93. 
153 Id. at 293. 
154 Id. at 292 (relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott for the proposition that the 
videos at issue “blatantly contradict[ed]” McDowell’s version of the events). 
155 4thRow Films, An Omar Broadway Film Trailer, YOUTUBE (July 7, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OK-tbfE-yts&list=PL49E86EB7D4D4E86B. 
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Festival and aired on HBO.156  Because these excerpts are very short and 
don’t include any portions of the video shot by the prison officials, my 
analysis is brief and admittedly speculative.  The influence of the 
medium is striking in Omar Broadway’s video:  the video camera was 
kept hidden and the shots are very constrained, penned in by the 
physical space of the cell, or taken from between the bars and often at a 
disorienting angle.  Like the dash-cam video in Scott v. Harris, both 
videos in McDowell v. Sherrer have a point of view, each placing the 
viewer in the position of either the guards or an inmate.  The fact that 
both were available in the case is noteworthy; Broadway’s video formed 
a visual rebuttal to the video shot by the extraction team and may have 
had something to do with the Third Circuit’s reversal.  While viewing 
the videos in a courtroom or chambers and in the context of a summary 
judgment motion is common to all these cases, the other contexts in 
which portions of the videos can be seen is illuminating.  In An Omar 
Broadway Film the videos are embedded in a dramatized documentary 
about the violence, danger, and boredom of prison life.  The trailers, like 
the film, are narrated, edited, and put to music in ways that emphasize 
the gritty realities of prison and the vulnerabilities of the inmates. 
Consider how different the same images may look when viewed on 
HBO or YouTube as entertainment or assessed by federal courts as 
evidence.  Attention to this difference in viewing environment may help 
judges realize that to read videos as legal evidence is to read them 
through an established interpretive lens that changes the ways images 
are seen.  Lastly, the viewers—law clerk, judge, student, inmate, 
television executive, etc.—all come with their own ways of seeing that is 
informed by experience, identity, and social conditions.  The different 
perceptions of the audience allows for multiple minority reports.  
Lawyers will do better by their clients at summary judgment if they have 
more interpretive techniques at their disposal, and courts will do better 
by the litigants if they have the visual literacy to allow videos the same 
range of meaning they allow to text and testimony. 
V.  CONCLUSION AND A RETURN TO MINORITY REPORT 
In conclusion, I return to Minority Report to contrast the film’s 
approach to law’s reliance on video evidence with the law’s own 
approach.  Film has a long history of critiquing its own forms of 
                                                 
156 Tambay, On HBO—“An Omar Broadway Film” (Prisoner Sneaks Camera into Prison to 
Record Abuse), SHADOW AND ACT (July 12, 2010, 9:30 AM), 
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Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/1
2013] The Image Cannot Speak for Itself 37 
representation,157 but it is more unusual for it to critique law’s use of 
film.  In many ways, Minority Report can be read as a critique of the 
seductive role of visual evidence within the law and the tendency to 
believe the accuracy and totality of what we see in the face of the 
excessiveness of the image.  Minority Report is most often discussed in 
legal literature as a vision of a dystopic surveillance state.  It is certainly 
that, but it is also a meditation on the power and abuse of sight and 
visuality.  In this sense, it is a parable about the dangers of readily 
believing what we see and of lacking a critical visual literacy. 
The world of 2054 is portrayed as one in which the saturation of 
images we experience today has only been enhanced and compounded 
by new technologies.  Everyone is eye-scanned as they enter buildings, 
stores, and subway stations; as they walk through public spaces, video 
billboards address them personally and magazines sport moving 
images.158  Video is not only projected in 3-D, but the red-light pleasure-
palaces use images to create simulated fantasies individually tailored to 
each person.159  Moreover, there are verbal refrains throughout the movie 
about sight, blindness, and knowledge.  Agatha, the most gifted of the 
precogs, repeatedly says, “Can’t you see?”—a phrase which captures our 
common-sense conflation of sight and understanding.160  Both the plot 
and the images of the movie are about the tricks of sight, the power of 
images, and the law’s fatally blind over-reliance on them.  The shots, 
editing, and lighting of the movie are often disorienting, drawing the 
viewers’ attention to the unreality and unreliability of what they are 
seeing on the screen.  The movie also layers images on top of each other 
so that we see characters seeing images, as in the still of Anderton 
examining the visions of the precogs.161  However, the transparency of 
the screen within the film allows a double viewing and draws the viewer 
into the world and surveillance plot of the film:  the viewer sees 
Anderton viewing the images on screen but also has the sensation of 
being viewed through the screen as well.  In this way the film projects 
the problems of seeing and believing out into the world of the audience. 
                                                 
157 Silbey, supra note 56, at 31.  Black Swan is one of the most recent examples.  BLACK 
SWAN (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2010). 
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(discussing the use of “iris scans” in the movie). 
159 MINORITY REPORT, supra note 20. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
Mezey: The Image Cannot Speak for Itself:  Film, Summary Judgment, and V
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
38 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
 
The Transparent Screen:  Minority Report (Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp. 2002) 
 
The many shots of Anderton viewing the visions of the precogs are 
shots of law enforcement reading visual evidence.  The film draws our 
attention to the “technologies” through which the images within the 
movie and the images of the movie are manipulated, arranged, given 
significance, and made to speak.  The visual evidence within the film is 
quite literally manipulated and arranged by Anderton with high-tech 
equipment that allows him to sort through the images of the precogs for 
the legally relevant details.  Likewise, the film images themselves are 
arranged and given meaning through cinematic technologies.  The 
audience experiences different ways of seeing and not seeing through 
the use of perspective, framing, lighting, movement, sound, pacing, and 
plot.  The dramatic chase scene in the mall toward the end of the movie 
encapsulates this cinematic lesson; the slightest adjustments of angle, 
timing, and chance dramatically change what we are able to see. 
The critique launched by the movie against the law’s use of images is 
one the law ought to take seriously:  that desire for clarity and truth 
encourages a willful denial of the fallibility of sight and the inevitable 
variety in ways of seeing and narrating the image.  It suggests that in our 
dedication to apparent truth and our naïve reliance on the image, we 
countenance injustice.  In Minority Report, the existence of a minority 
report meant that alternative futures were available for some of the 
people imprisoned for murders they had not yet committed.  Given the 
excess information that images bring to the courtroom and the paltry 
interpretive tools that lawyers and judges bring to images, we need to 
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imagine alternative futures to the one that the Supreme Court 
condemned us to in Scott v. Harris—a future in which we abandon our 
critical thinking and visual judgment and let the image speak for itself. 
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